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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the set of bribe-proof rules in the context of the division
problem. The division problem consists of allocating a xed amount of a perfectly
divisible good (or a task) among a group of n agents. A rule maps preference
proles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. This is often considered as an
instance of an economy with private goods since an allocation is a n-dimensional
vector (specifying the amount allocated to each agent) and each agent only cares
about his own share.1 Sprumont (1991) shows that if each agent has single-peaked
preferences over his share, then the uniform rule is the unique Pareto e¢ cient,
strategy-proof, and anonymous rule. A preference relation is single-peaked if it has
a unique maximal share and on each of its sides the preference relation is strictly
decreasing. Single-peakedness is a meaningful domain restriction if we interpret the
division problem as the reduced model of a more general problem where the good
has a xed price (or the task is paid at a xed wage); then, strictly increasing and
convex preferences in the two-dimensional space dened by the share of the good (or
e¤ort on the task) and money will generate single-peaked preferences on the interval
of all possible shares. Strategy-proofness requires that no agent can obtain a better
share by misrepresenting his preference relation. Pareto e¢ ciency requires that no
group of agents can obtain better shares by redistributing their original shares. In
the context of an allocation problem where there is a perfectly transferable good
it is natural to combine both principles and to require that rules should be bribe-
proof in the sense that no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups
to misrepresent their preferences and, after an appropriate redistribution of their
shares, each obtain a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting
subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share.
Bribe-proofness combines the principles of Pareto e¢ ciency and strategy-proofness.
It is very well understood that in public goods economies Pareto e¢ ciency and
strategy-proofness are incompatible unless social choice functions are either dicta-
torial or restricted to operate in small preference domains.2 In contrast, Barberà,
Jackson, and Neme (1997) shows that the class of Pareto e¢ cient and strategy-
1Sprumont (1995), Barberà (1996), Barberà (2001), and Barberà (2006) are surveys of the
literature on strategy-proofness in which the division problem plays a distinguished role.
2For instance, in the context of a society choosing a level of a public good, Moulin (1980)
characterizes Pareto e¢ cient and strategy-proof social choice functions as a particular subclass of
generalized median voter schemes whenever agents have single-peaked preference relations on the
set of possible levels of the public good and monetary transfers among agents are not admissible.
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proof rules in the division problem is very large. Specically, they characterize the
set of sequential allotment rules as the class of Pareto e¢ cient, strategy-proof, and
replacement monotonic rules. Replacement monotonicity requires that if an agent
receives a larger share after changing his preference relation then all the other agents
should receive smaller shares.
Schummer (2000) proposes, for general economies with quasi-linear utilities, a
similar concept of bribe-proofness. Roughly, Schummer (2000) shows that under
a bribe-proof rule, each agents payo¤ is continuous with respect to other agents
reported valuations and identies conditions on the domain of valuations under
which bribe-proof rules must be constant. In addition to Schummer (2000), very few
papers have studied bribe-proofness. Esö and Schummer (2004) examines whether
a second-price auction with two bidders (with private and independent values) is
bribe-proof in the sense that a bidder may pay the other bidder to submit a zero
bid. In the context of the marriage model with endowments Fiestras-Janeiro, Klijn,
and Sánchez (2004) characterizes the class of consumption rules under which optimal
rules are immune to manipulation via predonation of endowments.
The results of the paper and its organization are the following. After notation
and basic denitions, Section 2 presents the properties of Pareto e¢ ciency, strategy-
proofness, and bribe-proofness as well as some of the basic relationships among
them. In particular, Lemma 1 states that all bribe-proof rules are Pareto e¢ cient
and strategy-proof and Example 1 exhibits a Pareto e¢ cient and strategy-proof
rule that is not bribe-proof. Section 3 introduces the properties of replacement
monotonicity and weak replacement monotonicity. Examples 2 and 3 show that
the class of all bribe-proof rules is strictly larger than the set of Pareto e¢ cient,
strategy-proof, and replacement monotonic rules. The main result of the paper
(Theorem 1) states that a rule is bribe-proof if and only if it is Pareto e¢ cient,
strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic. This implies that the class of
all bribe-proof rules is strictly larger than the family of sequential allotment rules
identied in Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997). Section 4 contains the proof of
Theorem 1. Section 5 concludes by rst showing the consequences of restricting in
the denition of bribe-proofness (as in Schummer (2000)) the sets of bribers and
bribed agents to be both singleton sets. Second, we discuss the consequences of
considering a stronger denition of bribe-proofness by allowing that each bribed
agent be indi¤erent between his original share and the share received once he is
compensated after declaring another preference relation. In particular, we show
that the uniform rule would not be bribe-proof according to this stronger denition.
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Finally, we indicate how to weaken the denition of sequential allotment rule (see
Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997)) to obtain the set of weakly sequential rules,
which coincides with the class of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.
2 Preliminaries
Agents are the elements of a nite set N = f1; :::; ng where n  2. They have to
share a given amount of a perfectly divisible good that, without loss of generality,
we assume to be equal to 1. An allocation is a vector (x1; :::; xn) 2 Rn+ such thatP
i2N xi = 1. We denote by A the set of allocations. Each agent i 2 N has
a complete preorder Ri over [0; 1], his preference relation. Let Pi be the strict
preference relation associated with Ri and let Ii be its indi¤erence relation. We
assume that agents have continuous preference relations in the sense that for each
x 2 [0; 1] the sets fy 2 [0; 1] j xRiyg and fy 2 [0; 1] j yRixg are closed. Preference
relations are assumed to be single-peaked. That is, Ri is single-peaked if it has a
unique maximal share (Ri) 2 [0; 1], the top of Ri, such that for any x; y 2 [0; 1],
we have xPiy whenever y < x <  (Ri) or  (Ri) < x < y.
We denote by R the set of continuous and single-peaked preference relations
on [0; 1] : Preference proles are n-tuples of preference relations on [0; 1] and they
are denoted by R = (R1; :::; Rn) 2 RN . When we want to stress the role of agent
is preference relation we will represent a preference prole R by (Ri; R i) and by
(RS; R S) if we want to stress the role in R of the preference relations of agents in
S.
A rule is a function  : RN  ! A; that is, Pi2N i(R) = 1 for all R 2 RN :
A minimal requirement on rules is Pareto e¢ ciency. Given a preference prole
R 2 RN , an allocation x 2 A is Pareto e¢ cient if there is no z 2 A such that for
all i 2 N , ziRixi, and for at least one j 2 N we have zjPjxj. Denote by E (R) the
set of Pareto e¢ cient allocations.
A rule is Pareto e¢ cient if it always selects a Pareto e¢ cient allocation. Formally,
Denition 1 A rule  is Pareto e¢ cient if for all R 2 RN ,  (R) 2 E (R).
It is immediate to verify that, when preference proles are single-peaked, Pareto
e¢ cient rules ration out all agents in the same side of their tops. That is, for each
R 2 RN :
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"X
j2N
(Rj)  1
#
=) [(Ri)  i (R) for all i 2 N ]
and "X
j2N
(Rj) < 1
#
=) [(Ri)  i (R) for all i 2 N ] :
Rules require each agent to report a preference relation. A rule is strategy-
proof if it is always in the best interest of an agent to reveal his preference relation
truthfully. Formally,
Denition 2 A rule  is strategy-proof if for all R 2 RN , all i 2 N , and all
R0i 2 R, i (Ri; R i)Rii (R0i; R i).
In addition to Pareto e¢ ciency and strategy-proofness we are specially interested
in rules that preclude the possibility that a group of agents gain by reallocating their
shares after one of its subgroups misrepresent their preference relations. Formally,
Denition 3 A rule  is bribe-proof if for all R 2 RN and all T  S  N , there
are no R0T  (R0j)j2T 2 RT and (tj)j2S 2 RS such that
P
j2S tj =
P
j2S j (R
0
T ; R T ),
tjRjj (R) for all j 2 S, and tiPii(R) for all i 2 T .
We will refer to agents in SnT as bribers and to agents in T as bribed agents. A
few comments about the notion of bribe-proofness are appropriated. First, ob-
serve that only bribed agents jointly misrepresent their preference relations al-
though, after reallocating their new shares, bribers weakly gain while all bribed
agents strictly gain. Second, the cardinalities of S and T are only restricted to
satisfy #T  #S  n. Schummers (2000) denition of bribe-proofness requires
#T  #S  2. Along the proof of Theorem 1 (Remark 2 and Lemma 5), we will
show that our notion of bribe-proofness coincides with the notion of individually
bribe-proofness in which it is required that #T  1 and #T  #S  n. Third,
as in Schummer (2000), one could require that all agents, bribers as well as bribed
agents, be strictly better o¤ after the misrepresentation of the preference relations
and the reallocation of the shares. Our Theorem 1 remains unchanged with this al-
ternative denition (see Massó and Neme (2003)). However, as we will argue at the
end of the paper, the requirement that all bribed agents should be strictly better o¤
is crucial; otherwise, if bribed agents may remain indi¤erent, then bribe-proofness
becomes too stringent and even the uniform rule is not bribe-proof according to
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this stronger notion.3 Finally, our notion of bribe-proofness implicitly assumes two
things. First, after the misrepresentation bribers and bribed agents can enforce the
payment of bribes; thus, and since the arrangement of the reallocation of shares
depends on the agentstrue preference relations, agents in S must trust each other.
Second, the deviating coalition S does not worry about a further bribe in response
to the rst one. These two issues potentially undermine the bite of bribe-proofness
and they deserve further research that is left for the future. However, and following
Schummers (2000) similar discussion on the rst issue, a notion that accommodates
these two conceptual di¢ culties would make bribes more di¢ cult; thus, rules that
are bribe-proof according to our denition will remain bribe-proof after taking into
account these considerations.
Our rst preliminary result establishes that all bribe-proof rules are indeed
Pareto e¢ cient and strategy-proof.
Lemma 1 All bribe-proof rules are Pareto e¢ cient and strategy-proof.
Proof The fact that a bribe-proof rule is strategy-proof follows immediately af-
ter considering in the denition of bribe-proofness the particular case where S =
T = fig. Assume  is not Pareto e¢ cient; that is, there exist R 2 RN , i 2
N , and (x1; :::; xn) 2 A such that xjRjj (R) for all j 2 N and xiPii (R) :
Take Q = fk 2 N j xk 6= k (R)g. Dene Q+ = fk 2 N j xk > k (R)g and Q  =
fk 2 N j xk < k (R)g. Observe that Q = Q+ [ Q  and i 2 Q. Without loss of
generality assume that i 2 Q+. Then, there exists at least one agent j 2 Q . Since
Ri and Rj are single-peaked,  (Ri) > i (R) and  (Rj) < j (R). Therefore, there
exists " > 0 su¢ ciently small such that  (Ri) > i (R)+ " and  (Rj) < j (R)  ".
Dene S = fi; jg, T = fig, R0i = Ri, ti = i (R)+", and tj = j (R) ". Notice that
ti + tj = i (R) + j (R), tiPii (R), and tjPjj (R). Hence,  is not bribe-proof.
Example 1 below exhibits a Pareto e¢ cient and strategy-proof rule that is not
bribe-proof.
Example 1 Let N = f1; 2; 3g be the set of agents and dene the rule  : RN ! A
3The uniform rule tries to allocate the shares as equal as possible, keeping the bounds imposed
by Pareto e¢ ciency (see Sprumont (1991) for its description and characterizations).
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as follows. For all R 2 RN ,
1 (R) = maxf0; 1   (R2)   (R3)g;
2 (R) =
(
 (R2) if 0R11
min f (R2) ; 1   (R3)g if 1P10;
3 (R) =
(
 (R3) if 1P10
min f (R3) ; 1   (R2)g if 0R11:
Observe that  is Pareto e¢ cient and strategy-proof. To see that  is not bribe-
proof, consider any R 2 RN such that  (R1) = 12 , 0P11; and  (R2) =  (R3) = 1.
Then  (R) = (0; 1; 0). Let R01 2 R be such that  (R01) = 12 and 1P 010: Then,
 (R01; R 1) = (0; 0; 1). Consider S = f1; 3g ; T = f1g; and t1 = t3 = 12 . Since 12P10
and 1
2
P30,  is not bribe-proof.
Lemmata 1 and 2 in Sprumont (1991) provides a fundamental one-agent result
about strategy-proof rules. The following Lemma, which will be intensively used
henceforth, adapts Sprumonts (1991) result to rules with more than one agent.
Lemma 2 Let  be a Pareto e¢ cient and strategy-proof rule. Then, for every
i 2 N and R 2 RN there exist 0  a(R i)  b(R i)  1 such that i(Ri; R i) =
med fa(R i); b(R i); (Ri)g :4
3 An Axiomatic Characterization of All Bribe-
proof Rules
Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997) characterizes the class of Pareto e¢ cient and
strategy-proof rules that satisfy the following additional requirement of monotonic-
ity.
Denition 4 A rule  is replacement monotonic if for all R 2 RN ; all i 2 N; and
all R0i 2 R, if [i (R)  i (R0i; R i)] then [j (R)  j (R0i; R i) for all j 6= i] :
Replacement monotonicity requires a symmetric treatment of agents. An in-
crease in agent is share after i changes his preference relation decreases the total
amount left to be allocated among the remaining agents. Replacement monotonicity
implies that none of the remaining agentsshares can increase.
4Given x; y; z 2 [0; 1], not necessarily di¤erent, dene med fx; y; zg as the number w 2 fx; y; zg
such that # fw0 2 fx; y; zg j w0  wg  2 and # fw0 2 fx; y; zg j w0  wg  2:
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Proposition 1 All Pareto e¢ cient, strategy-proof, and replacement monotonic rules
are bribe-proof.
Proposition 1 will immediately follow from Remark 1 and Theorem 1 below and
therefore its proof is omitted.
Example 2 below illustrates the fact that Pareto e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness,
and replacement monotonicity do not fully characterize the class of bribe-proof rules
since  is bribe-proof (and, by Lemma 1, Pareto e¢ cient and strategy-proof) but it
is not replacement monotonic.
Example 2 Let N = f1; 2; 3g be the set of agents and dene the rule  : RN ! A
as follows. For all R 2 RN ,
 1 (R) =  (R1) ;
 2 (R) =
(
min f (R2) ; 1   (R1)g if 0R11
max f0; 1   (R1)   (R3)g if 1P10;
 3 (R) =
(
min f (R3) ; 1   (R1)g if 1P10
max f0; 1   (R1)   (R2)g if 0R11:
To show that  is bribe-proof assume otherwise and let T  S be the corresponding
sets of agents involved in the bribe at R 2 RN . Since  rations out all agents in the
same side of their tops,  is Pareto e¢ cient. Moreover, no agent can manipulate
 because all agents either receive their top or are only able to change their shares
in the opposite direction of their top. Thus, #S 6= 1 and #S 6= 3: Observe that for
all R^ 2 RN ,  1(R^) = (R^1): Hence, 1 =2 T and, without loss of generality, assume
that 1 2 S: Thus, S = f1; jg and T = fjg, where j is equal to either 2 or 3. Let
(t1; tj) 2 Rf1;jg and R0j 2 R be such that t1 + tj =  1(R0j; R j) +  j(R0j; R j).
Since  1(R
0
j; R j) = (R1) =  1(R),  j(R
0
j; R j) = tj. By hypothesis, tj =
 j(R
0
j; R j)Pj j(R); implying that  is not strategy-proof, a contradiction. Hence,
 is bribe-proof. Observe that  is not replacement monotonic. To see it, consider
any (R1; R2; R3) 2 RN and R01 2 R such that ( (R1) ;  (R2) ;  (R3)) =
 
1
4
; 1; 1

,
0P11,  (R01) =
3
4
, and 1P 010. Then,  (R1; R2; R3) =
 
1
4
; 3
4
; 0

and  (R01; R2; R3) = 
3
4
; 0; 1
4

, which means that  is not replacement monotonic.
Tops-only rules are specially interesting because they have the informationally
nice feature that they only require agents to reveal their best-shares since they only
depend on their tops. Formally, a rule  is tops-only if for all R;R0 2 RN such that
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 (Ri) =  (R
0
i) for all i 2 N ,  (R) =  (R0). Observe that the rule  in Example 2
is not tops-only. Example 3 below shows that the equivalence between bribe-proof
rules and Pareto e¢ cient, strategy-proof, and replacement monotonic rules does not
hold even in the subclass of tops-only rules.
Example 3 Let N = f1; 2; 3g be the set of agents and dene 	 : RN ! A as
follows. For all R 2 RN ,
	1 (R) =  (R1) ;
	2 (R) =
(
min f (R2) ; 1   (R1)g if  (R1)  12
max f0; 1   (R1)   (R3)g if  (R1) < 12 ;
	3 (R) =
(
min f (R3) ; 1   (R1)g if  (R1) < 12
max f0; 1   (R1)   (R2)g if  (R1)  12 :
Observe that 	 is tops-only. By an argument similar to the one used in Example
2 it is easy to see that 	 is bribe-proof. Consider any R 2 RN and R01 2 R such
that ( (R1) ;  (R2) ;  (R3)) =
 
1
4
; 1; 1

and  (R01) =
3
4
. Then, 	(R) =
 
1
4
; 0; 3
4

and
	(R01; R2; R3) =
 
3
4
; 1
4
; 0

, which shows that 	 is not replacement monotonic.
In order to obtain a full characterization of all bribe-proof rules (by means of
Pareto e¢ ciency and strategy-proofness), we raise the following question: is there
any weaker notion of replacement monotonicity that together with Pareto e¢ ciency
and strategy-proofness completely characterize the set of bribe-proof rules? Theorem
1 below answers the question in the a¢ rmative and Denition 6 identies precisely
this weaker concept of replacement monotonicity.
Denition 5 A rule  is weakly replacement monotonic if for all R 2 RN ; all
i 2 N; and all R0i 2 R, if [i (R)  i (R0i; R i) and i (R) 6= (Ri) or i (R0i; R i) 6=
(R0i)] then [j (R)  j (R0i; R i) for all j 6= i]:
Remark 1 All replacement monotonic rules are weakly replacement monotonic.
Before stating Theorem 1 we want to point out the relationship between the two
replacement monotonicity properties and the property of non-bossiness. A rule  is
non-bossy if for all R;R0 2 RN and i 2 N such that R i = R0 i, if i(R) = i(R0)
then (R) = (R0). First, observe that replacement monotonicity implies non-
bossiness. Second, Example 2 shows that weak replacement monotonicity does not
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imply non-bossiness ( is weakly replacement monotonic and bossy). However, weak
replacement monotonicity and tops-onlyness imply non-bossiness.
Now, we are ready to state and prove our axiomatic characterization of bribe-
proof rules in terms of Pareto e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, and weak replacement
monotonicity.
Theorem 1 A rule is bribe-proof if and only if it is Pareto e¢ cient, strategy-proof,
and weakly replacement monotonic.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
The following weaker notion of bribe-proofness will be useful in the proof of Theorem
1.
A rule  is individually bribe-proof if for all R 2 RN , all i 2 N , and all R0i 2 R
there are no S  N and (tj)j2S 2 RS such that i 2 S,
P
j2S tj =
P
j2S j (R
0
i; R i) ;
tjRjj (R) for all j 2 S, and tiPii(R).
Observe that individually bribe-proof rules are immune to bribes in which the
set of bribed agents is a singleton.
Remark 2 Assume  is bribe-proof. Then,  is individually bribe-proof.
Lemma 5 at the end of this section will show that both notions of bribe-proofness
are indeed equivalent. The proof of Lemma 1 also shows that the following remark
holds.
Remark 3 Let  be an individually bribe-proof rule. Then,  is Pareto e¢ cient
and strategy-proof.
The proof of Theorem 1 consists of three lemmata. Lemma 3 says that all Pareto
e¢ cient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic rules are individually
bribe-proof. Lemma 4 states that all individually bribe-proof rules are Pareto ef-
cient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic. Finally, Lemma 5 says
that all individually bribe-proof rules are bribe-proof.
Lemma 3 Assume  is Pareto e¢ cient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement
monotonic. Then,  is individually bribe-proof.
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Proof Let be a Pareto e¢ cient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic
rule. Assume that  is not individually bribe-proof; i.e., there exist R 2 RN ;
i 2 S  N , R0i 2 R and (tj)j2S 2 RS such thatX
j2S
tj =
X
j2S
j(R
0
i; R i); (1)
for all j 2 S;
tjRjj(R); (2)
and
tiPii(R): (3)
Since  is Pareto e¢ cient,
(R) 6= (R0i; R i): (4)
Without loss of generality, we assume that
P
j2N (Rj)  1 (the proof whenP
j2N (Rj) < 1 is symmetric). By Pareto e¢ ciency, j(R)  (Rj) for all j 2 N:
By conditions (2) and (3),
tj  j(R) for all j 2 S (5)
and
ti > i(R): (6)
By (1), (5), and (6), X
j2S
tj =
X
j2S
j(R
0
T ; R T ) >
X
j2S
j(R): (7)
By (3), (Ri) 6= i(R): Hence, by Lemma 2, there exist a(R i) and b(R i) such
that
i(R) = med fa(R i); b(R i); (Ri)g = b(R i): (8)
By strategy-proofness of , i(R)Rii(R0i; R i):
 Assume i(R) = i(R0i; R i). Because i(R) < (Ri); by weak replacement
monotonicity, (R) = (R0i; R i); which contradicts condition (4).
 Assume i(R) 6= i(R0i; R i): Because i(R) < (Ri); by Lemma 2 applied
to R0i and condition (8), i(R
0
i; R i) = med fa(R i); b(R i); (R0i)g  b(R i).
Thus, i(R) > i(R0i; R i): Since  is weakly replacement monotonic,
j(R
0
i; R i)  j(R) for all j 6= i: (9)
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Then,
P
j2N j(R) =
P
j2N j(R
0
i; R i), condition (9), and i 2 S implyP
j =2S j(R
0
i; R i) 
P
j =2S j(R). Thus,
P
j2S j(R) 
P
j2S j(R
0
i; R i) =P
j2S tj; which contradicts condition (7). 
Lemma 4 Let  be an individually bribe-proof rule. Then,  is Pareto e¢ cient,
strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic.
Proof Let  be an individually bribe-proof rule. Hence, by Remark 3,  is
Pareto e¢ cient and strategy-proof. Suppose  is not weakly replacement monotonic.
Without loss of generality, assume there are R 2 RN ; i 2 N; R0i 2 R such that
i(R
0
i; R i) 6= (R0i); and either:
1. i(R) < i(R0i; R i) and there exists j 6= i such that j(R) < j(R0i; R i); or
2. i(R) = i(R0i; R i) and there exist j; j
0 2 N such that j(R) < j(R0i; R i)
and j0(R0i; R i) < j0(R):
We will consider the two possibilities separately.
Case 1: Assume i(R) < i(R0i; R i) and j(R) < j(R
0
i; R i) for some j 6= i: We
distinguish between two subcases:
Case 1.1:
P
k2Nnfig (Rk) + (R
0
i)  1:
By Pareto e¢ ciency of ; (Rk)  k(R0i; R i) for every k 2 Nnfig and
(R0i) > i(R
0
i; R i): Because (Rj)  j(R0i; R i) > j(R), (Rj) > j(R):
Therefore, by Pareto e¢ ciency of ,
(Rk)  k(R) for every k 2 N: (10)
Let S = fk 2 N j k(R0i; R i) < k(R)g [ fig: Note that, by feasibility,
S 6= fig and because j(R) < j(R0i; R i); j =2 S: Since
P
k2N k (R
0
i; R i) =P
k2N k (R) and
P
k=2S k (R
0
i; R i) >
P
k=2S k (R),
P
k2S k (R
0
i; R i) <P
k2S k (R) : Therefore, by denition of S and condition (10), k(R
0
i; R i) <
k(R)  (Rk) for all k 2 Sn fig, and by hypothesis, i(R) < i(R0i; R i) <
(R0i). Hence, there exists " > 0 su¢ ciently small such that
" <
X
k2S
k(R) 
X
k2S
k(R
0
i; R i) (11)
and " <  (R0i)  i(R0i; R i): Condition (11) can be rewritten as,
i(R
0
i; R i)  i(R) + " <
X
k2Snfig
k(R) 
X
k2Snfig
k(R
0
i; R i):
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For each k 2 Sn fig there exists k > 0 such that k < k(R)   k(R0i; R i)
and X
k2Snfig
k = i(R
0
i; R i)  i(R) + ": (12)
Dene ti = i(R0i; R i)+" (or equivalently ti = i (R)+[i(R
0
i; R i)  i(R)]+
") and tk = k(R) k for all k 2 Sn fig : First, observe that, by denition of
ti and (tk)k2Snfig, k(R
0
i; R i) < tk and i(R
0
i; R i) < ti <  (R
0
i) : Second,P
k2S
tk =
P
k2Snfig
k(R) 
P
k2Snfig
k + i(R) + [i(R
0
i; R i)  i(R)] + "
=
P
k2Snfig
k(R)  i(R0i; R i) + i(R)  "+ i(R)
+ [i(R
0
i; R i)  i(R)] + "
=
P
k2S
k(R);
where the second equality follows from condition (12). Since tkPkk(R0i; R i)
for all k 2 S, it follows that  is not individually bribe-proof.
Case 1.2:
P
k2Nnfig (Rk) + (R
0
i) < 1:
By Pareto e¢ ciency of , (Rk)  k(R0i; R i) for every k 2 Nnfig and
(R0i)  i(R0i; R i): But the hypothesis that i(R0i; R i) 6= (R0i) implies
(R0i) < i(R
0
i; R i): By Lemma 2,
i(R
0
i; R i) = med fa(R i); b(R i); (R0i)g = a(R i)
and
i(R) = med fa(R i); b(R i); (Ri)g  a(R i);
implying i(R0i; R i)  i(R);which contradicts the hypothesis that i(R) <
i(R
0
i; R i).
Case 2: Assume i(R) = i(R0i; R i) and there exist j; j
0 2 N such that j(R) <
j(R
0
i; R i) and j0(R
0
i; R i) < j0(R): We distinguish between two subcases:
Case 2.1:
P
k2Nnfig (Rk) + (R
0
i)  1:
By Pareto e¢ ciency of , k(R0i; R i)  (Rk) for every k 2 Nnfig and
i(R
0
i; R i)  (R0i): By assumption, i(R0i; R i) 6= (R0i) and thus
i(R
0
i; R i) = i(R) < (R
0
i): (13)
By Pareto e¢ ciency of ,
j0(R
0
i; R i) < j0(R)  (Rj0): (14)
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By conditions (13) and (14), there exists " > 0 such that i(R0i; R i) <
i(R) + " < (R
0
i) and j0(R
0
i; R i) < (j0(R)  ") < j0(R)  (Rj0). Since
P 0i and Pj0 are single-peaked preference relations, (j0(R)  ")Pj0j0(R0i; R i)
and (i(R) + ")P 0ii(R
0
i; R i): Letting S = fi; j0g, ti = i(R) + "; and tj0 =
(j0(R)  ") we conclude that  is not individually bribe-proof.
Case 2.2:
P
k2Nnfig (Rk) + (R
0
i) < 1:
By Pareto e¢ ciency of ; (Rk)  k(R0i; R i) for every k 2 Nnfig and
(R0i)  i(R0i; R i): But the hypothesis that i(R0i; R i) 6= (R0i) implies
(R0i) < i(R
0
i; R i) = i(R): (15)
Since (Rj0)  j0(R0i; R i) < j0(R) it follows, from the Pareto e¢ ciency of
, that
P
k2N (Rk)  1 and
(Rj)  j(R) < j(R0i; R i): (16)
By conditions (15) and (16), there exists " > 0 such that (R0i)  i(R)  
" < i(R
0
i; R i) = i(R) and (Rj) < (j(R) + ") < j(R
0
i; R i). Since
P 0i and Pj are single-peaked preference relations, (i(R)  ")P 0ii(R0i; R i)
and (j(R) + ")Pjj(R0i; R i): Letting S = fi; jg, tj = j(R) + "; and ti =
(i(R)  ") we conclude that  is not individually bribe-proof. 
The proof of Theorem 1 nishes with Lemma 5 that, together with Remark 2,
establishes the equivalence of the two notions of bribe-proofness.
Lemma 5 Assume  is individually bribe-proof. Then,  is a bribe-proof.
Proof Let  be an individually bribe-proof rule and assume that  is not bribe-
proof; namely, there exist R 2 RN , T  S  N with #T  2, R0T 2 RT , and
(tj)j2S 2 RS such that
P
j2S tj =
P
j2S j (R
0
T ; R T ) ; for all j 2 S;
tjRjj (R) ; (17)
and for all i 2 T ,
tiPii(R): (18)
Without loss of generality, assume that T is minimal in the sense that for all i 2 T
there are no S  Tnfig; RTnfig 2 RTnfig, and (tj)j2 S 2 R S with the property thatP
j2 S tj =
P
j2 S j( RTnfig; R Tnfig); tjRjj(R) for all j 2 S, and t{^P{^{^(R) for all
{^ 2 Tnfig: Assume thatPj2N (Rj)  1 (the other case is done symmetrically). By
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Remark 3,  is Pareto e¢ cient. Then, (17), (18), and
P
j2S tj =
P
j2S j (R
0
T ; R T )
imply X
j2S
j (R
0
T ; R T ) >
X
j2S
j (R) : (19)
We claim that by the minimality condition of the set T , for each i 2 T ,X
j2S
j(R
0
Tnfig; Ri; R T ) 
X
j2S
j (R) : (20)
Assume otherwise; i.e., there exists i 2 T such thatX
j2S
j (R) <
X
j2S
j(R
0
Tnfig; Ri; R T ): (21)
Pareto e¢ ciency of ,
P
j2N (Rj)  1; and (18) imply that for all k 2 Tnfig;
(Rk) > k(R): Take k 2 Tnfig and consider any Rk 2 R such that ( Rk) = 1:
Observe that, by Remark 3,  is strategy-proof. Hence, by Lemma 2, k(R) =
k( Rk; R k): By Lemma 4, and since  is individually bribe-proof,  is weakly
replacement monotonic. Thus,
( Rk; R k) = (R):
Hence, X
j2S
j
 
Rk; R k

=
X
j2S
j (R)
<
X
j2S
j(R
0
Tnfig; Ri; R T ) by (21)

X
j2Snfkg
(Rj) + ( Rk) since ( Rk) = 1:
Since ( Rk) = 1; there exists (tj)j2S 2 RS such that
P
j2S tj =
P
j2S j(R
0
Tnfig; Ri; R T ),
and for all j 2 S, j(R) = j( Rk; R k) < tj  (Rj): Hence, for all j 2 S,
tjPjj(R); contradicting the minimality of T because S would bribe Tnfig at R
through R0Tnfig. Thus, (20) holds.
From (19) and (20), we obtainX
j2S
j
 
R0Tnfig; Ri; R T

<
X
j2S
j (R
0
T ; R T ) =
X
j2S
tj;
implying that the set S bribes agent i at prole (R0Tnfig; Ri; R T ), contradicting the
assumption that  was individually bribe-proof. 
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5 Final Remarks
Before nishing the paper, three remarks about the denition of bribe-proofness
are appropriate. First, and as it has already been said, Schummer (2000) denes
a bribe by requiring that the set of bribed agents T as well as SnT be, at most,
singleton. If we would ask for this additional requirement our class of bribe-proof
rules would be substantially enlarged since there would be many bribe-proof rules
without being weakly replacement monotonic. To see this, consider the case where
N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and R 2 RN is such that 1 (R) <  (R1).5 Let R01 2 R be
such that  (R01) = 1 (R)   " and assume 2 (R01; R 1) = 2 (R) + 34" <  (R2),
3 (R
0
1; R 1) = 3 (R)+
3
4
" <  (R3), and 4 (R01; R 1) = 4 (R)  12". Observe that
 is not weakly replacement monotonic. Moreover,  is not bribe-proof (according
to our denition) because there exist S = f1; 2; 3g, t1 = 1 (R)+ "6 , t2 = 2 (R)+ "6 ,
and 3 (R) + "6 such that t1 + t2 + t3 =
P
j2S j (R
0
1; R 1) and tjPjj (R) for all
j 2 S. However,  would be bribe-proof in the sense of Schummer (2000) because
neither agent 2 nor agent 3 alone can compensate agent 1 because with agent 1s
misrepresentation they gain 3
4
" while agent 1 loss is ".
Second, our denition of bribe-proofness requires that all bribed agents should
be strictly better o¤after the bribe. If instead we admit that a bribed agent be indif-
ferent after the misrepresentation and the reallocation then bribe-proofness would
be too restrictive. For instance, the rules of Examples 1, 2, and 3 are no longer
bribe-proof in this stronger sense. Moreover, the uniform rule U does not satisfy
this stronger notion of bribe-proofness. To see that let N = f1; 2; 3g be the set of
agents and consider any R = (R1; R2; R3) 2 RN such that (R1) = (R2) = 1 and
(R3) = 0: Then, U(R) = (12 ;
1
2
; 0). Consider now any (R02; R
0
3) 2 Rf2;3g such that
(R02) =
3
4
and (R03) = 1: Then, U(R1; R
0
2; R
0
3) = (
1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
): Let T = S = f2; 3g
and t2 = 23 and t3 = 0: Since t2 =
2
3
P2
1
2
= U(R) and t3 = 0R30 = U3(R): Thus,
U is not bribe-proof in this stronger sense. All sequential dictator rules (roughly,
given an order of agents, they receive sequentially their tops, up to feasibility) are
bribe-proof in this stronger sense. We conjecture that this set of rules (one for each
5In order to make the argument more transparent and brief we omit the complete (and tedious)
description of . Roughly,  is dened as follows: for all R 2 RN such that Pj2N (Rj) < 1
or (R1)  14 ;  (R) = U(R), where U is the uniform rule, while for all R 2 RN such thatP
j2N (Rj)  1 and (R1) < 14 , 1(R) = (R1) and the remaining 1   (R1) is split among
agents 2, 3, and 4 according to a weakly sequential rule (see Massó and Neme (2003)) dened
by the function g (for N 0 = f2; 3; 4g) associated to the uniform rule relative to qH = qL =
( 3 4(R1)+4"8 ;
3 4(R1)+4"
8 ;
1
4   ") for a given " > 0 such that " < 14   (R1).
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order) coincides with the class of rules that satisfy bribe-proofness in this stronger
sense.
Third, in Massó and Neme (2003) we present a complete description of the
full class of bribe-proof and tops-only rules by weakening condition (4.) in the
description of sequential allotment rules (page 13 in Barberà, Jackson, and Neme
(1997)). This class, the set of weakly sequential rules, can be described by using
their denition but replacing condition (4.) by the following condition:
Let qn = gn(q0; R) and q0n = gn(q0; (R0i; R i)). Then,
if (R0i) < (Ri) and
P
i2N (Ri)  1 then q0nj  qnj for every j 6= i;
if (R0i) > (Ri) and
P
i2N (Ri) < 1 then q
0n
j  qnj for every j 6= i.
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